We present a computational model of the emergence of gaze following in infant caregiver interactions. Using the model we explore the plausibility of the hypothesis that gaze following is a skill that infants acquire because they learn that monitoring their caregiver's direction of gaze allows them to predict where interesting objects or events in their environment are. In particular, we demonstrate that a specific basic set of mechanisms is sufficient for gaze following to emerge and we show how plausible alterations of model parameters motivated by findings on developmental disorders lead to impairments in the learning of gaze following.
Introduction
The capacity for shared attention is a cornerstone of human social intelligence. It is an early foundational skill of vital importance for learning in social contexts. By the end of their first year of life, normally developing infants show robust gaze following [4] as well as a variety of other shared attention skills, such as pointing and requesting behaviors. How do these skills develop? Why is their emergence disrupted in certain developmental disorders? Our particular focus is the emergence of gaze following behavior. We propose a computational model for the emergence of gaze following based on reinforcement learning. The model demonstrates that gaze following behavior can be robustly learned with a generic basic set of mechanisms [6] . Our learning-based view is in stark contrast to earlier nativist/modularist accounts of the emergence of shared attention skills [1, 12] and offers very different explanations for failures of the emergence of gaze following in developmental disorders such as autism and Williams syndrome.
The work described in here is part of the MESA project at UC San Diego (Modeling the Emergence of Shared Attention, http://mesa.ucsd.edu), a larger effort to understand the emergence of shared attention in normal and abnormal development through closely integrating observational studies with computational modeling approaches [6] .
The Basic Set Hypothesis
We start from the premise that earlier nativist/modularist theories of the emergence of shared attention skills [1] are of little explanatory power. The problems of such theories have been eloquently pointed out by many researchers [15, 5] and will not be discussed here. We believe that better theories will be based on a careful analysis of the developing infant's interactions with her environment during development. For the case of of gaze following, Moore has suggested that gaze following may emerge because infants learn that the caregiver's direction of gaze is predictive of where interesting things are in the environment [10] . This idea is at the core of our model. Our goal is to formalize this hypothesis into a concrete mathematical model and to test its plausibility and implications using computer simulations.
Previously, we hypothesized that gaze following may emerge from an interplay of a basic set of mechanisms [6] which may contain the following:
• a set of perceptual and motivational biases and habituation mechanisms driving the infant to look at and shift attention between "interesting" visual stimuli
• a generic hedonistic learning mechanism that learns behavioral strategies to satisfy the above preferences
• a structured environment providing correlations between where caregivers look and where interesting stimuli are.
We will briefly discuss each component in turn. Evidence that these mechanisms are indeed in place at the time that gaze following starts to emerge is reviewed in Fasel et al., 2002. Perceptual Preferences. Visual preferences of infants have been well studied in various kinds of preferential looking paradigms. A key component of our model is a strong infant social orientation. Normally developing infants enjoy looking at faces in general and their caregivers in particular. A further assumption that we are making is that infants' face processing skills allow them to distinguish different caregiver head poses by the time that gaze following emerges. Habituation. We propose that the chief reason for the infant to shift gaze from one target to another is that due to habituation it is more "rewarding" for the infant to shift gaze to a different object after looking at one object for some time. Behavioral results suggest that between 8 and 12 weeks, infants begin to shift attention away from a central stimulus when a peripheral stimulus is introduced [2] . At six month infants begin breaking mutual gaze to look at distal objects.
Reward Driven Learning. We hypothesize that a hedonistic learning mechanism, i.e. a learning method seeking to maximize the pleasure or reward of the infant, is important for gaze following to emerge. In this sense, gaze following is useful for the infant since it allows the infant to maximize the amount of rewarding visual stimuli that she will see.
Structured Environment. A critical assumption of our model is that the infant's environment shows strong correlations between where the caregiver is looking and where interesting things are. In general, people tend to look at other people, or their own hands, while manipulating objects [8] . This tendency should introduce exactly such a correlation. In a parallel study, we are currently collecting observational data from naturalistic mother infant interactions to investigate this point more carefully.
How can these elements of the basic set work together to allow for gaze following to emerge? The infant's social predispositions will lead to frequent face-to-face interactions with the caregiver. Due to habituation the infant will more or less frequently look away from the caregiver's face. If the infant happens to look at the location looked at by the caregiver, she is somewhat more likely to see something interesting than if she shifts gaze to a different location. This allows the infant to establish an association between the caregiver's head pose and the "correct" gaze shift likely resulting in a rewarding sight.
Computational Model Based on Reinforcement Learning
In the following we present a simple computational model to demonstrate how the mechanisms of the basic set lead to the emergence of gaze following. To this end, we formalize our basic set of mechanisms in the framework of a biologically plausible reinforcement learning method -temporal difference learning. The goal of this exercise is to illustrate that the small basic set of plausible mechanisms is indeed sufficient for the emergence of gaze following to occur. We do not suggest, however, that these mechanisms are necessarily the only ones that are important for a comprehensive theory of the emergence of gaze following.
Our infant model is that of a pleasure-driven observer. There are many ways of formalizing this idea but a particularly appropriate formal framework is reinforcement learning [14] . In reinforcement learning, an agent interacts with its environment, occasionally receiving rewards, which it tries to maximize. In particular, we are interested in temporal difference learning approaches (TD learning), which have recently been associated with some aspects of the function of the basal ganglia [13] .
In reinforcement learning models, at any time t the world (agent and environment) is in a particular state st. Time progresses in discrete steps (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) corresponding to roughly 250 ms. Upon observing the current state s t , the agent decides to take an action at and potentially receives a reward rt as a consequence. The potentially probabilistic mapping from state to action is the agent's policy, which is adapted during learning. The goal of the agent is to maximize its future discounted reward
where r t+k+1 is the reward received at time t + k + 1, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is a so-called discount factor. The discount factor determines how heavily the agent values the prospect of future rewards over immediate rewardsand lets them affect its behavior. For simplicity, we assume that infant and caregiver are facing each other and remain in the same position. The caregiver can look either at the infant or at a set of N = 10 discrete regions in space. The infant can look at the caregiver or at any of the same regions. This shifting of gaze is the only way the infant model interacts with the environment. Thus, we predict that locomotion and physical interaction with the environment -although potentially very important -may not be strictly necessary for the emergence of gaze following.
Caregiver and Environment Model. In the environment there is always one interesting target present at any time in one of the N regions. There is a certain probability p valid that the caregiver is looking at the location of that target. If the caregiver is not looking at the target, the caregiver's new direction of gaze is drawn from a uniform distribution over all of the other N locations (one for the infant plus N-1 regions of space not containing the target).
After some minimal fixation time at one location T fix = 4 (1.0 sec.) the interesting target is relocated with some probability p shift = 0.5 at each time step. The target is moved to a different location and a new direction of the caregiver's gaze is determined as described above. The parameters above were chosen ad hoc but will ultimately be set to match the findings from our observational studies on infant caregiver interactions.
Infant Model. The infant model receives rewards for looking at interesting things. The amount of reward received depends on the contents of the infants gaze and how habituated the infant is to those contents. There are four possible things for the infant to see, a frontal view of the caregiver (in case the caregiver is also looking at the infant), a profile view of the caregiver (in case the caregiver is not looking at the infant), an interesting object, or no object. Associated with these are base rewards R frontal , R profile , R object , R nothing . The actual reward received by the infant, or 'instantaneous reward', is the base reward mediated by habituation. As the infant looks at a location, the target, or the caregiver, the infant habituates to it. Similarly, the infant dishabituates to any objects it is not currently looking at. when the infant model is not looking at something the infant dishabituates to it. For each location and object in the environment, including the caregiver, the infant has a habituation value, represented as a percentage of the potential reward. As the infant continues to fixate on an object its habituation value decreases. The habituation level to the current object of fixation at any time step is given by h fix (t) = h fix (0)e −t , where h fix (0) is the habituation level at the beginning of the current fixation, and t is the time since the start of the fixation. Thus, the instantaneous reward actually received by the infant at time t is r inst (t) = R fix h fix (t), where R fix ∈ {R frontal , R profile , R object , R nothing } is the base reward for the object being fixated.
Likewise, when the infant is not looking at an object it dishabituates according to h location (t) = 1 − h fix (0)e −t , where t is the time since last looking at the location and h object is the level of habituation to that location.
Based on the work of Findlay & Walker [7] , who propose that the decisions of when to shift gaze and where to shift gaze are made in somewhat separate neural pathways, the infant model consists of two separate agents. The state space of the 'when-agent', which decides whether to continue to fixate on the same location or shift gaze, has two dimensions. The first dimension represents the time the infant has been fixating at the same location discretized as the number of time steps (0, 1, 2, . . . , 8, 9 or above). The second dimension is the instantaneous reward received by the infant. This is the total reward the infant receives on that time step taking habituation into account discretized evenly into ten discrete regions between the maximum and minimum possible rewards.
If the when-agent makes the decision to shift gaze, the 'where-agent' determines the target of the gaze shift. The state space of this agent has only a single dimension: the caregiver's direction of gaze, which can be any of the N regions of space, the infant, or unknown. Unless the infant is looking at the caregiver, the caregiver's direction of gaze will be unknown to the infant.
The agents use a Temporal Difference algorithm to estimate so-called state-action values Qt(s, a). These are estimates of the future discounted reward the agent will receive when choosing action a in state s and following the current policy thereafter. Estimation of the Qt(s, a) is done with the Sarsa algorithm [14] . On taking an action and receiving a reward, the temporal difference -the difference between the estimated future discounted reward of the next state plus any immediate reward received and the current estimated value of that state-action pair -is computed as
where Q(st, at) is the state-action value assigned to the state-action pair (s, a) at time t. In the Sarsa algorithm this temporal difference is used to adjust the state-action value by
where α is a learning rate parameter. We still need to specify how the infant model chooses its actions based on the estimated action values, i.e., chooses where to look next. It turns out that always choosing the action with the highest Q-value for the current state is typically not a good idea because it may lead to the agent "getting stuck" with a suboptimal policy early on and never discovering a better solution. It is typically better for the agent to sometimes chose exploratory actions that appear suboptimal given the agent's current knowledge, in order to get a better estimate of their true value. This is know as the exploration vs. exploitation dilemma in reinforcement learning. Our infant model chooses actions in a probabilistic manner using a softmax decision rule. Action a is chosen with probability:
whereQt(s, a) = Qt(s, a)/ max a |Qt(s, a )| and τ is a so-called temperature parameter. The temperature determines how random the model's actions will be, i.e. how much it values exploration over exploitation. The lower τ , the more likely it is for the model to chose the action with the highest Qvalue. In the extreme case of τ → 0 the model will follow a greedy policy, i.e. it will always chose the action with the highest Q-value. For τ → ∞, the model will chose all actions with equal probability. Hence, varying τ amounts to varying how the agent trades off exploration vs. exploitation.
Experiments
In this section we describe a first analysis of the model and the influence of some of the model's parameters on its learning behavior. In all of the following experiments we will set the learning rate to α = 0.0025, the discount factor to γ = 0.8, and the temperature parameter of the softmax action selection to τ = 0.095. Our standard set of reward values are R frontal = R profile = R object = 1 and R nothing = 0. The probability of the caregiver looking to the location of the target when making a shift is set to p valid = 0.75. To quantify the emergence of gaze following in the model and its dependence on model parameters we use the following approach. At specific points during the learning process we temporarily "freeze" the model and evaluate its behavior for 1000 time steps (which corresponds to slightly more than 4 minutes), after which the learning process resumes. The model behavior at these stages of the learning process is analyzed by observing the infant model interacting with the environment and computing two statistics. The caregiver index CGI is defined as the frequency of gaze shifts towards the caregiver: CGI = # gaze shifts to caregiver # gaze shifts .
The gaze following index GFI is the frequency of gaze shifts that lead from the location of the caregiver to where the caregiver is looking: GFI = #gaze shifts from caregiver to location looked at # gaze shifts .
An example run of the system is shown in Fig. 1 left. The model quickly learns to look at the caregiver. Gaze following behavior emerges somewhat later. Learning performance as a function of caregiver-and object reward. The z-axis is the number of learning iterations necessary to achieve a GFI ≥ 0.3.
Modeling Autism and Williams Syndrome
While traditional nativist/modularist accounts typically propose broken or missing modules as the origin of developmental disorders [1] , our learning based account prompts us to look for potential differences in the components of the basic set that may lead to different developmental trajectories. For autism spectrum disorders and Williams syndrome, a particular interesting candidate is the reward structure of the model, since it is well established that autistics tend to avoid looking at faces while Williams syndrome patients are reported to show an abnormally high preference for looking at faces. Due to space limitations, this will be the only variation reported here. We systematically varied the reward structure, i.e. parameters R frontal , R profile and R object over a range of values with R profile = R frontal . Figure 1 (right) summarizes the results. For R object ≤ 0 no gaze following behavior emerges. This makes intuitive sense because if the objects/events that the caregiver tends to look at are not rewarding for the infant, there is no advantage in gaze following behavior. More interestingly, if R frontal and R profile are negative, modeling aversion to faces as seen in autism, gaze following behavior does not develop normally. Interestingly, an analysis of the model shows that it will nevertheless slowly learn how to follow gaze but only rarely executes this behavior since it is unrewarding to do so. This matches a puzzling finding by Leekam et al. [9] demonstrating that autistics are often quite capable of following gaze if explicitly told to do so, although they may not exhibit the behavior normally.
We also tested what would happen if the reward for looking at the caregiver is much higher than the reward for looking at the target. Our experiments show that in this case the learning of gaze following can be substantially delayed. This is reminiscent of Williams syndrome, where children exhibit an abnormally high preference for faces in combination with a delay in the learning of gaze following.
Discussion
We have presented a computational model of the emergence of gaze following. The underlying idea of this model is that infants learn to follow gaze because their caregivers tend to look at interesting targets that the infant will find rewarding to look at. If, indeed, the caregiver does this, the formal model demonstrates that a generic basic set of mechanisms is indeed sufficient for the emergence of gaze following in infant caregiver interactions. This is not to say that there are no other mechanisms playing an important role in the emergence of gaze following, it merely says that such mechanisms should not be strictly necessary for the emergence of gaze following.
A systematic analysis of the model's learning process and its dependence on system parameters showed that gaze following behavior emerges robustly for wide ranges of parameter values. But also, we found that changes to the reward structure of the model could lead to deficits in the learning of gaze following reminiscent of autism and Williams syndrome. We consider the model's ability to produce disruptions of the emergence of gaze following as seen in two radically different developmental disorders as quite attractive. In essence, we feel that our learning based account may provide a more parsimonious explanation of the emergence of gaze following than previous nativist/modularist approaches such as Baron-Cohen's.
Of course, our model must be seen as only a first step towards a full computational account of the emergence of gaze following. In many respects, the model is still overly simplistic. Examples are the restriction to a small set of discrete spatial regions and the absence of peripheral vision, the stereotypic, non-interactive behavior of the caregiver model, and the restriction of having only one interesting target present at any time, just to name a few. Nevertheless, we feel that our simple model is a useful tool in theorizing about the emergence of gaze following. In some respect, the utmost simplicity of the model can even be seen as a strength, since it brings the computational essence of the underlying mechanisms into focus. However, in order to account for additional experimental findings, such as the stage-wise development observed by Butterworth and Jarrett [3] , some of the above-mentioned short-comings will be addressed in future work. Recent robotic modeling work by Nagai et al. [11] has started to address the issue of peripheral vision and the development of distinc stages of gaze following as observed by Butterworth and colleagues.
